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Casenote

Ashcroft in a Defendant's Wonderland:
Redefined Pleading Standards in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal' is
the Court's awaited clarification of its earlier decision in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly.' In the wake of Twombly, courts and commentators
debated its application to cases other than antitrust disputes.3 The

1. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 1l1., 520 F.3d 797, 802-03 (7th
Cir. 2008). In Limestone Development, the court acknowledged that the narrowest possible
reading of Twombly limits its holding to antitrust cases. Id. at 803. However, the court
adopted a broader reading for the Seventh Circuit: Plaintiffs must meet the Twombly facial
plausibility requirement for complaints in any "potentially complex litigation" or in any
case when judgment against the defendant creates an "in terrorem" effect. Id. (citing Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)); see also, e.g., Scott Dodson,
PleadingStandardsafter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 142
(2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (positing that after
Twombly, a plaintiff gives the defendant fair notice in an antitrust case if the complaint
states a facially plausible claim for relief, but grounds other than facial plausibility may
satisfy the notice requirment in other cases); Amber Pelot, Note, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly: MereAdjustment or StringentNew Requirement in Pleading?,59 MERCER L. REV.
1371, 1385-91 (2008).
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Court announced in Iqbal that the Twombly complaint requirement of
facial plausibility applies to all civil actions filed in federal court, not
just antitrust cases.4 Accordingly, Iqbal currently governs the standards by which all plaintiffs in federal court must draft complaints to
state a legally sufficient claim for relief and survive a defendant's motion
to dismiss.5 Survival will be tougher because this case confirms the end
of the liberal pleading standards developed in Conley v. Gibson' and its
progeny.7
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The dispute inAshcroft v. Iqbal' stems from the response of American
authorities to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001 (9-11). After the attack, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) began searching for persons connected to the event.
Some individuals suspected of having links to the attacks were held on
immigration charges, and a subset of those individuals was deemed to
be of high interest to the investigation and placed in detention centers.?
Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim citizen of Pakistan and the plaintiff in this
case, was arrested in November 2001 on criminal charges and detained
as a high interest individual in the 9-11 search. While those charges
were pending, the plaintiff was held at the Metropolitan Detention
Center (MDC) in New York and placed in a section of the MDC called
the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU),
which operates under maximum security conditions. 10
The plaintiff returned to Pakistan after pleading guilty to the criminal
He
charges against him and serving a term of imprisonment."
thereafter filed a Bivens"2 action in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York against federal officials and corrections
officers connected to his detention in the ADMAX SHU. 3 The plaintiff's complaint specifically alleged that the defendants in this appeal
-Director of the FBI Robert Mueller III and former United States

4.

129 S. Ct. at 1953.

5. See id.
6. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
8. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
9. Id. at 1943.
10. Ild.
11. Id.
12. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
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Attorney General John Ashcroft-violated the First Amendment 4 and
Fifth Amendment i" by designating the plaintiff as a high interest
suspect on account of his race, religion, or national origin. 16 The
complaint further alleged that the FBI, under Mueller's direction,
"'arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men... as part of its
investigation of the events of September 11 '"1 and that "'[tihe policy
of holding post-September-llth detainees in highly restrictive conditions
of confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by [the
defendants] in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.'" 1
According to the complaint, the defendants "knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject' [the plaintiff] to harsh
conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological
interest.'" 9 In addition, the complaint alleged that Ashcroft was a
"'principal architect'" of this policy of arresting Arab Muslims 2 and
that Mueller was "instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and
implementation.'"21
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the
ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to support the
claim that the defendants had intentionally violated the plaintiffs
constitutional rights.22 Relying on Conley v. Gibson,' the district
court denied the motion, holding that the complaint had alleged at least
some facts on which, if true, the plaintiff would be entitled to relief.2'
The defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal in the United States
In the meantime, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.'

14. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
17. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand 47,
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,2005), rev'd
sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
[hereinafter Complaint]).
18. Id. (first alteration in original) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Complaint, supra note 17, 69).
19. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Complaint, supra note 17, 1 96).
20. Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 17, 1 10).
21. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Complaint, supra note 17, 9 11).
22. Id.
23. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
24. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. According to the Supreme Court's decision in Conley, "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46.
25. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
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Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.26 Accordingly,
the Second Circuit attempted to apply Twombly and held that the
plaintiffs complaint adequately alleged facts sufficient to raise its
claim-that the defendants personally participated in unconstitutional
discrimination against the plaintiff-to the level of plausibility.27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a 5-4 decision, the
Court held that the facial plausibility pleading standard enunciated in
Twombly applies to all civil actions in federal court.'
Therefore,
allegations that assert only legal conclusions, or that are merely
consistent with liability, do not meet the plausibility standard.'
Reasoning that the plaintiff's allegations suggested only that the
defendants' liability was possible rather than plausible, the Court
reversed the ruling of the court of appeals.3 0
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
One of the first Supreme Court decisions to address the standards for
pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was United States
v. Employing PlasterersAss'n of Chicago,3 in which the Court considered the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint in an antitrust dispute. 32
The complaint alleged that the defendants, a Chicago trade association
and local labor union of plastering contractors, violated the Sherman
Act 33 by conspiring (1) to suppress competition from local plastering
contractors, (2) to prevent contractors outside the state from doing
business in Chicago, and (3) to stop new local contractors from entering
into business by requiring approval of new contractors by the defendants' private examining board.' 4 Noting that local business restraints can
constitute violations of the Sherman Act, the Court held that the
plaintiff's complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief because it
related "every element necessary to recover" under the statute.3 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that in the pleading stage
of a case, courts must take all of the plaintiff's allegations into account,
The Court advanced two policy
whether factual or conclusory.3

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

550 U.S. 544 (2007); see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
Id. at 1953.
Id. at 1949-50.
Id. at 1950-51, 1954.

31.

347 U.S. 186 (1954).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 187.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
Employing Plasterers,347 U.S. at 187-88.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 188.
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reasons for declining to impose a stricter pleading standard: (1) parties
already have the right to request more facts via a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(e)r7 motion for a more definite statement; and (2) Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 5638 motions for summary judgment already
prevent frivolous claims from reaching trial.3 9
It is the Court's decision in the seminal case of Conley v. Gibson,4'
however, that is most cited for the law of "notice pleading" that
subsequently became the recognized standard for pleading under Federal
In Conley the Court addressed
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(aX2)."
whether the plaintiff's complaint stated a sufficient claim for relief that
could survive the defendant's motion to dismiss.4 2 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had discriminated against them in violation
of the Railway Labor Act.' In their complaint, the plaintiffs further
alleged that the defendants, a local railway union with whom the
plaintiffs had contracted for certain protection against discharge and loss
of seniority, failed to protect them from discriminatory discharges and
in some instances from losing seniority when rehired after discharge.
The plaintiffs, who were black employees, further alleged that the
defendants gave more protection to white employees and had not
represented black employees with equal good faith." Justice Black,
writing for the majority, concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
stated a claim of discriminatory representation45 and in doing so laid
the foundation for the standard of notice pleading.46 Justice Black
explicitly endorsed the decisions of several courts of appeal, holding that
"a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."47 Justice Black
further elaborated that a plaintiff's complaint need not plead detailed

37. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(e).
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
39. Employing Plasterers,347 U.S. at 189.
40. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
42. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
43. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2006); Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
44. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
45. Id. at 45.
46. See id. at 45-46.
47. Id. (citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Contl Collieries, Inc.
v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942); Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of
Worcester, Mass., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940)).
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facts; instead, it need only give a defendant notice of and grounds for the
claim."
Justice Black provided three reasons for adopting the rule of notice
pleading. First, the forms appended to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure plainly illustrate that a plaintiff is not required to plead
detailed facts in his complaint.49 Second, the Rules established the
process of discovery and other pretrial procedures in order to further
define the factual basis for a plaintiff's claim beyond the allegations
contained in the complaint.' Third, this standard best accords with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e), 1 which states that "[pileadings
must be construed so as to do justice." 2 It would not be just, the Court
opined, to allow a pleading mistake by counsel to affect the entire
outcome of an action.5
In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,' the Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Conley in the
context of a claim for municipal liability.' The Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeal on the issue of
whether courts could apply a heightened standard of pleading to claims
for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.56 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held in Elliot v. Perez"7 that
in cases involving claims against government officials who would likely
invoke the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff's complaint must
plead facts with detail and particularity to overcome that defense and
state a claim for relief."8 The Fifth Circuit later applied this same
pleading standard to cases alleging violation of § 1983 by municipal
corporations. 9 The Supreme Court rejected this heightened standard
and reiterated the decision in Conley, holding that except in cases of

48. Id. at 47.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 47-48.
51.

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e).

52. Id.; accord Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. Prior to the 2007 amendments to the Rules, the
text of Rule 8(e) appeared in Rule 8(f) and included the word substantial immediately
before the word justice. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e), with FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (amended
2007), reprintedin FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH SELECTED STATUTES, CASES,
AND OTHER MATERIALS 31 (Stephen C. Yeazell ed., 2007).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
See id. at 168.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.
751 F.2d 1472 (1985).
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167.

59.

Id.
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fraud or mistake under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),' the
plaintiff need not plead facts with particularity.6 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist advanced three reasons for the Court's
affirmation of Conley.62 He relied first on the interpretive canon of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius:' Because Rule 9(b) expresses that
complaints alleging fraud or mistake must allege facts with particularity, he explained, the Rules exclude application of that standard in any
other case.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist further stated that requiring
plaintiffs to plead facts with specificity in cases other than those alleging
fraud or mistake would be a substantive change to the Rules that, if
made at all, must be made by Congress.' Finally, as did Justice Black
in Conley, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned in Leatherman that courts
can look to other pretrial procedures, such as summary judgment and
discovery management, to keep unmeritorious claims from reaching
trial.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,67 the Supreme Court rejected
Conley's "no set of facts" standard of pleading, but the decision left
lower courts wondering when that new pleading standard should be
applied. Like the Court in Employing Plasterers,the Court in Twombly
considered whether the plaintiff's complaint alleged facts sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss in an antitrust dispute.6 9 In a 7-2 decision, the Court held as follows: (1) a complaint does not state a claim for
relief if it contains only legal conclusions, and a mere recitation of the
elements of a cause of action is conclusory; 7° (2) a complaint only
sufficiently alleges an antitrust conspiracy if it shows that a conspiracy
was plausible on the face of the complaint;7'1 and (3) a conspiracy is
facially plausible if the court can reasonably infer that discovery will
yield evidence of an illegal agreement 72 but is not facially plausible7 3if
the complaint alleges facts merely consistent with unlawful conduct.

60. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
61.
62.

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
See id.
Id.; see generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009) ("[To express or

63.
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other...
64.

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 168-69.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 556-67.

984

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Justice Souter, author of the majority opinion, provided two policy
justifications for the facial plausibility standard of pleading. Noting the
famous words in Conley often cited for the rule of notice pleading,
Justice Souter remarked that a complaint probably does not provide the
defendant with "'fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests'" if the plaintiff pleads only legal conclusions rather
than facts.74 Justice Souter also opined that given the increased costs
and scope of discovery in antitrust cases, plaintiffs should at least be
required to plead facts with some specificity in those cases in order to
forestall expensive discovery on a potentially massive scale.75
Justice Souter explained that the Court's decision had not created a
new standard for pleading; rather, the Court simply interpreted Rule
8(a)(2) to require more than reciting the elements of a claim and alleging
conclusions that those elements have been met. 76 Although this
requirement appears to conflict with the Court's holding in Employing
Plasterersthat a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it relates
all of the elements necessary to a claim for recovery," the decision in
Employing Plasterers was not explicitly overruled. 78 The Court in
Twombly did, however, expressly reject the proposition in Conley that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'"79 The Court
reasoned that Conley is better read to mean that after a complaint
alleges a facially plausible claim, any set of facts consistent with the
allegations contained in the complaint will support that claim. 80
Justice Stevens authored a dissent in Twombly, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, in which he asserted that a court must accept all factual
allegations of a complaint as true81 and that the Conley "no set of facts"
test is a well-established and adequate standard for pleading complaints.8 2 In addition to illustrating that a plethora of legal precedent
has relied on the "no set of facts" interpretation of Conley," Justice
Stevens pointed out several major reasons why he disagreed with the
majority's facial plausibility pleading standard. First, as the older

74. Id. at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting Conley, 335 U.S. at 47).
75. See id. at 558.
76. See id. at 555-56.
77.
78.
79.

See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
See Twombiy, 550 U.S. 544.
Id. at 561-63 (quoting Conley, 335 U.S. at 45-46).

80. Id. at 563.
81. Id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 577-78.
83. See id. at 577 & n.4.
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decisions supporting more liberal pleading standards had asserted, he
suggested that discovery control and summary judgment can adequately
manage the burdens of discovery in antitrust disputes.'
Second,
Justice Stevens argued that there is no practical way of distinguishing
between facts and legal conclusions." Third, he claimed that the
decision defeats the purpose of Rule 8(a)(2), which is intended to
facilitate litigation rather than forestall it.' While factual allegations
were distinguished from legal conclusions in the requirements of code
pleading, that distinction was abolished by the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." Finally, like Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Leatherman, Justice Stevens flatly stated that this kind of change in
federal pleading standards must be made by Congress, not by the
judiciary." The scope of the change, Justice Stevens said, was such
that it "rewrite[s] the Nation's civil procedure textbooks and call[s] into
doubt the pleading rules of most of its States."89
The Court's decision in Twombly left several questions open for
resolution: Does the facial plausibility pleading standard apply to any
civil action filed in federal court, or only to antitrust disputes? What
precisely does it mean to be merely consistent with plausibility? And
what sorts of facts justify a reasonable inference that the plaintiff will
produce evidence of liability?
III.

CouRT's RATIONALE

Iqbal,9°

In Ashcroft v.
the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the proper standards for notice pleading under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).9 1 The Court ruled that (1) in
order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter that, if accepted as true, states a facially
plausible claim for relief;92 and (2) this standard applies to all civil

84. Id. at 573.

85. Id. at 574 (arguing that "it is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among
ultimate facts, evidence, and conclusions" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jack
B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on ProceduralReform, 57 COLUM. L. REV.

518, 520-21 (1957))).
86. See id. at 575.
87. Id. at 589-90; CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1201 at 86 & n.11 (3d ed. 2004).
88. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579.
89. Id.
90. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
92. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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actions in United States district courts.93 Under Iqbal a claim is
facially plausible if it asserts more than legal conclusions or allegations
merely consistent with the unlawful conduct alleged.9
A.

The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote the Court's majority opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Alito .9 Justice Kennedy attempted to clarify the standards for notice
pleading in ight of the Court's recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,96 which overturned long-standing interpretations of Rule
8(a)(2).'
In addressing the sufficiency of the allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint, Justice Kennedy first outlined the current state of
the law on notice pleading." He noted that Rule 8(a)(2) provides that
in order to state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain a "'short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'"
Justice Kennedy cited Twombly for the proposition that a
short and plain statement of a claim need not allege detailed factual
allegations.'0° He then related the Court's holding in Tvombly as
follows: (1) the plaintiff's claim must allege factual matter sufficient to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face; (2) a claim is facially
plausible when the court can reasonably infer from the facts alleged that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged; and (3) when a
complaint pleads facts merely consistent with a defendant's liability, the
court can only infer that the defendant is possibly rather than plausibly
liable.'
Justice Kennedy next discussed two legal principles that supported the
Court's decision in Twombly. First, although a court typically must
accept all of the facts alleged in a plaintiff's complaint as true, acceptance does not extend to legal conclusions "'couched as ...

factual

' '2
allegation[s]. ""
Second, a complaint only survives a motion to
dismiss if it "states a plausible claim for relief."0 3 Justice Kennedy
endorsed the statement by the United States Court of Appeals for the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1953.
Id. at 1949-50.
Id. at 1941.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(aX2)).
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Id.
Id. at 1949-50 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Id. at 1950.
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Second Circuit in the decision below that judges must "draw on [their]
judicial experience and common sense" to determine whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief within the specific context of each
case."°4 Justice Kennedy then explained that facts merely consistent
with a defendant's liability illustrate only a possible rather than
plausible claim for relief. 5
Justice Kennedy proceeded to apply the Twombly construction of Rule
8 to the facts of the instant case, first noting what the Court perceived
to be the legal conclusions in the plaintiff's complaint that were not
entitled to an assumption of truth."° The plaintiff's assertion that the
defendants "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject [him]' to harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penological interest,'" was, Justice Kennedy reasoned, only
conclusory because it did nothing more than formulaically recite the
elements of a claim for unconstitutional discrimination."°7 Thus,
Justice Kennedy declined to treat those allegations as true.1°8
Justice Kennedy next considered whether the facts in the plaintiff's
complaint alleging discrimination suggested a plausible claim for relief
and determined that it did not."° The Court admitted that the facts
alleged were consistent with purposeful, invidious discrimination but
proffered an "'obvious alternative explanation'" for the plaintiff's arrest
and detention." ° It was more likely, Justice Kennedy reasoned, that
the plaintiff and other Arab Muslims were detained as high interest
suspects in the 9-11 investigation because the 9-11 hijackers were Arab
Muslims belonging to the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Qaeda, which
was headed by the Arab Muslim Osama bin Laden and whose members
were also largely Arab Muslims."' Justice Kennedy stated that under
this alternative explanation, the defendants' detention of Arab Muslims
was lawful because the defendants had a nondiscriminatory purpose to
detain illegal aliens with potential connections to the 9-11 terrorist
attacks." 2 Thus, Justice Kennedy explained that because this lawful

104. Id.

105. See id.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 1951.
Id (quoting Complaint, supra note 17, 96).
Id.
Id. at 1951-52.
Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
Id.
Id.
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alternative more likely explained the defendants'
conduct, a court could
3
not infer that discrimination was plausible.
Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that the plaintiff had completely failed
to allege facts showing that the defendants had purposefully adopted a
discriminatory policy of classifying some detainees as high interest
because of their race, religion, or national origin.114 Justice Kennedy
pointed out that an individual is not liable for discrimination unless he
personally acts on the basis of a constitutionally protected characteristic.116 Therefore, Justice Kennedy reasoned that for the complaint to
state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must have alleged that the
defendants themselves had purposefully decided to classify some Arab
Muslims as high-interest suspects because of their race, religion, or
national origin."6 Justice Kennedy looked at what he considered to be
the only related allegation in the plaintiff's complaint, which was the
defendants' approval of "'restrictive conditions of confinement'" for
persons detained in the 9-11 terrorist investigation." 7 However,
Justice Kennedy determined that this allegation did "not show, or even
intimate, that [the defendants] purposefully housed detainees in the
ADMAX SHU due to their race, religion, or national origin. " "'
Justice Kennedy next addressed the plaintiff's argument that the
pleading standard applied in Twombly should be limited to the context
of antitrust disputes." 9 Justice Kennedy explained that such a
reading of Twombly would be incompatible with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure because the Court's decision in Twombly depended on its
interpretation of Rule 8, which applies to all civil actions in district
courts. 20 Thus, the Court ruled that the Rule 8 plausibility standard
of pleading
expounded in Twombly applies to all civil actions in federal
21
courts.'

Finally, Justice Kennedy addressed whether a complaint "generally"
alleges discriminatory intent according to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) 12 2 when the plaintiff alleges only the legal conclusion
that a defendant's intent was discriminatory. 123 Justice Kennedy

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1951-52.
Id. at 1952.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 17,
Id.
Id. at 1953.
Id.
Id.

122.

FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).

123.

See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.

9 69).
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noted that under Rule 9(b), intent and other conditions of a person's
mind may be alleged generally, but he then cited Charles Wright and
Arthur Miller's FederalPractice and Procedure24 in asserting that the
standard of generally alleging intent in Rule 9 is simply another
articulation of the short and plain statement standard in Rule 8(a)(2).125 On that basis, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Twombly
standard of facial plausibility of a claim also applies to allegations of
intent, including discriminatory intent.'2
Having explained that alleging legal conclusions does not state a
plausible claim for relief under Rule 8(a)(2), Justice Kennedy extrapolated that a plaintiff does not sufficiently allege intent if he merely asserts
a conclusion of intent." Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff
had asserted only a conclusion of discriminatory intent when he alleged
that the defendants had discriminated against him because of his race,
religion, or national origin."2 Thus, the Court
ruled that he had failed
29
to sufficiently allege discriminatory intent.
B.

Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, who wrote for the majority in Twombly, dissented
because he believed that the majority misinterpreted the pleading
standard espoused in Twombly and incorrectly characterized some of the
plaintiff's allegations as legal conclusions. 3 ° His dissent was joined
by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.'
According to Justice Souter, the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for
relief under Rule 8(a)(2). 3 2 First, Justice Souter pointed out that the
defendants actually admitted they would be liable for the conduct of
their subordinates if the defendants had actual knowledge that their
subordinates had discriminated against detainees in classiflying some as
being of high interest.'33 Reciting the plaintiff's allegations in the
complaint," 4 Justice Souter determined that if the allegations were
taken as true, the defendants not only had knowledge that their

124. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1301, at 291 (3d ed. 2004).
125. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1958-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).

131. Id. at 1954.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1958.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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subordinates discriminated against Arab Muslims but also created the
discriminatory policy their subordinates followed."
Justice Souter next spoke to the majority's interpretation of the
Court's decision in Twombly, which he asserted was inaccurate."3
Justice Souter stated that the decision in 71vombly did not require a
court to consider whether factual allegations were probably true; rather,
Justice Souter said the Court clearly held in Twombly that a court must
take all allegations as true even if the court doubts their veracity. 3 7
Justice Souter maintained that there is only one exception under which
the court need not accept the plaintiff's allegations as true: when the
allegations are "sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it.""~
He duly noted that such allegations were not at issue here.13 9 In
response to the majority's finding that the plaintiff's allegations were
merely consistent with liability, Justice Souter differentiated the
example of mere consistency in Twombly from the plaintiff's allegations
in this case. 40 He remarked that in Twombly the allegation that the
defendant companies had engaged in parallel conduct was consistent
with both legal, free-market activity and an illegal agreement not to
compete.14 1 In contrast, the plaintiff in Iqbal alleged that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race, religion, or
national origin, which is inconsistent with legal conduct. 142 Justice
Souter thus appears to suggest that a claim is facially plausible under
Twombly and Rule 8(a)(2) if the complaint alleges facts that are
inconsistent with lawful conduct, even if those facts are probably not
true because a more likely alternative may explain the defendant's
actions.'43
Justice Souter also took issue with the majority's characterization of
the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as conclusory.'" He did not
dispute the proposition that mere legal conclusions are not entitled to an
assumption of truth, but he determined that the plaintiff's allegations
were not legal conclusions and therefore should have been taken as

135. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 1959-61.
137. Id. at 1959 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that a court must assume
all allegations are true even if they are doubtful)).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1959-60.
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Id. at 1960.
See id. at 1959-60.
See id. at 1960-61.
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true."4 According to Justice Souter, the plaintiff pleaded specific facts,
not a legal conclusion, when he alleged that certain named individuals
discriminated against Arab Muslim men on the basis of their race,
religion, or national origin.146 Thus, because the plaintiff's complaint
also alleged that the defendants knew of and condoned this discrimination, the plaintiff had shown that the defendants were plausibly liable
for discrimination.14 7 The majority's fault, Justice Souter contended,
was in its consideration of this latter allegation in isolation without
reference to the allegations of specific conduct by the defendants'
subordinates.'"
C. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissent rebutted what he perceived to be the
majority's policy reasons for its interpretation of the Court's decision in
Twombly. 49 He noted the majority's emphasis on the importance of
freeing government officials from the burdens of litigation, but he
posited that the law can forestall interference with official government
work without resorting to the facial plausibility standard for pleading."5 For example, a trial court could respond to a defendant's
assertion of qualified immunity by structuring discovery in a way that
diminishes unwarranted burdens on government officials, such as by
obtaining and evaluating discovery from lower level officials before
allowing discovery related to higher level officials.15 ' Justice Breyer
decisively stated that the majority did not provide any convincing
arguments for why these alternative means of managing cases are
inadequate, and he52would have affirmed the denial of the defendant's
motion to dismiss.

IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal'" affects every party to a
civil lawsuit filed in any district court in the United States. Important145. Id.
146. Id. at 1960. The plaintiff named the chief of the FBrs International Terrorism
Operations Section and the assistant special agent in charge for the FBI's New York field
office as specific individuals who unconstitutionally discriminated against Arab Muslims.
Id.
147. See id. at 1960-61.
148. Id. at 1960.
149. See id. at 1961-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1961.
151. Id. at 1961-62.
152. Id. at 1962.
153. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).

992

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

ly, if the pleading standards developed in civil procedure jurisprudence
prior to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 1" and Iqbal did in fact give
defendants fair notice of any claims against them, the effects of Iqbal
will unfairly disadvantage plaintiffs in a "dramatic departure from
settled procedural law."1" But that is probably an understatement.
The Supreme Court's decision has the potential to confuse the traditional
roles of judge and jury, result in the dismissal of many meritorious
claims, and undermine the civil process of discovery. Ultimately, the
decision may be superseded by an act of Congress.
Under Iqbal facts are merely consistent with liability and thus do not
state a plausible claim for relief if the court believes a defendant's
Thus, the
conduct can be explained by a more likely alternative."
Court in Iqbal is essentially asking judges to assess the credibility of
plaintiffs' allegations because a judge must consider whether those
allegations are probably true when the judge determines whether a more
likely alternative may explain the conduct alleged. The Court asks
judges to make that determination according to their common sense and
experience.'" Yet, a critical justification for the American right to
trial by jury has been that jurors, unlike an individual judge, bring to
bear a broad spectrum of experiences and opinions that reduces the
potential for bias and better ensures that the law will be applied
according to society's current values. 165 That justification is lost when
an individual judge can, according to his common sense and experience,
conclude that the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint probably did not
happen, thus dismissing the plaintiff's claim before the plaintiff ever
gets the chance to discover evidence that may show its claim was
probable.
The Iqbal decision also frustrates the purpose of discovery because the
standard for pleading, which occurs before discovery, now more closely
resembles the nonmovant's burden in a motion for summary judgment,
which usually occurs after discovery is complete. In order to defeat a
defendant's motion for summary judgment, after the defendant has met
its burden of production by showing that the plaintiff cannot produce
evidence on one or more of the elements of its claim, 5 9 the plaintiff
must produce evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in favor of

154.

550 U.S. 544 (2007).

155. Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
157. Id.
158. See CHARLES W. JOINDER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 138 (Greenwood Press
1972) (1962).
159. FED. R. CIrV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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the plaintiff, and evidence is construed in favor of the plaintiff."8
Similarly, in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Iqbal, a
complaint must allege facts that, if taken as true, prove the plaintiff's
version of events is the most likely one. 1 ' The plaintiff's version must
be the "most likely one" in the eyes of the judge because the judge's
perception of a more likely factual alternative will render the plaintiff's
allegations "merely consistent" with the defendant's liability and,
therefore, insufficient to state a claim for relief under the plausibility
pleading standard. 62
The Court's decision in Iqbal imposes a burden on a plaintiff defending
a motion to dismiss that is probably even greater than the burden of a
plaintiff on the receiving end of a summary judgment motion; the latter
plaintiff does not have to show that its version of the facts is more likely
than any other alternative. Rather, summary judgment is inappropriate
when a genuine issue of material fact exists, or when the defendant fails
to meet its burden of proving that the plaintiff cannot show evidence in
support of one or more elements of a claim."e ' Thus, the Iqbal decision
can kick plaintiffs out of court before discovery starts when courts have
previously refrained from doing so even after discovery ends. Moreover,
under Iqbal the defendant who moves to dismiss before discovery-unlike the defendant who moves for summary judgment after
discovery-has no burden of production whatsoever.
Given these problematic implications of Iqbal, it is perhaps unsurprising that Congress reacted swiftly to the decision. On July 22, 2009,
Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill called the Notice Pleading
Restoration Act of 2009,"6 which would supersede Iqbal and restore
the authoritative force of Conley's "no set of facts" test for the sufficiency
Similar legislation was proposed in the House of
of pleading."
Representatives on Novemember 11, 2009, by Representative Jerrold
Because seven of nine Supreme Court Justices decided in
Nadler.'
favor of Iqbal's precursor Twombly, however, these bills may face more
opposition than this quick congressional reaction suggests.
CASSIDY M. FLAKE

160. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,251 (1986) (citing Improvement Co.
v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).
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